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INTRODUCTION
The thesis of this paper is that there currently exist two separate and unequal frameworks
for international trade on the one hand and international human rights on the other.  These
separate frameworks have different and often contradictory foundations in philosophy
and values, laws and standards, and procedural and enforcement mechanisms.  Most
importantly, they have different and often contradictory substantive impacts on the lives
of human beings.  In particular, the trade framework has superceded and marginalized the
human rights framework to the point where major violations of human rights are carried
out under the legal imprimatur of international trade, negatively impacting the well being
of countless millions of people around the world.
The paper will discuss and then compare the separate and unequal foundations of
international trade and human rights at several broad levels: philosophy and values, laws
and standards, and procedures, and enforcement mechanisms.  The paper will then
examine how these contradictions have resulted in widespread violations of human rights,
focusing on economic, social, and cultural rights.  The paper will conclude with concrete
recommendations for harmonizing the two frameworks to ensure the recognition, respect,
protection, and fulfillment of human rights values in the growing arena of international
trade.
I. INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS
This chapter provides an overview of the international human rights regime.  It consists
of three sections: the philosophy and values of human rights, the development of human
rights laws and standards, and the procedures and mechanisms for enforcing human
rights.
The chapter highlights a fundamental divide between human rights theory and practice.
On the one hand, the philosophical basis of human rights is grounded in universal values
and absolute priorities, with all states having undertaken solemn legal commitments to
recognize, respect, protect, and fulfill these rights.  On the other hand, the international
community has steadfastly refused to grant the human rights regime any priority in actual
practice, leaving enforcement mechanisms largely reliant on the voluntary compliance
and good will of duty-holders except in rare instances when powerful political interests
derive advantage from human rights enforcement.  This divide looms even larger when
compared to the effective enforcement mechanisms to deter and remedy violations of
international trade law (discussed in the next chapter).
A. Human Rights Values and Resource Constraints
This section discusses the philosophical basis of human rights in theory and principle.
The “absolute” nature of human rights values is examined in the context of a world with
limited resources for implementing human rights and all other policies.  The section
critiques the conventional rationale for dividing human rights into categories based on
resource requirements and constraints.  It concludes with a framework for maintaining
the relative priority of universal human rights principles even in a world of limited
resources.
A.1 Questioning Deontological Rights
The philosophical basis of human rights values is deontological.  In other words, human
rights are ends in themselves.  They do not derive their value from a utilitarian calculus
of maximizing benefits or achieving efficiency.  As one commentator explains, “What is
central about human beings is not their tendency to rationally maximize their self-
interest, but their intrinsic human dignity and worth.”
1  This is reflected in human rights
law through the use of words like “inalienable” and “inherent.”  Following the
philosophy of Locke and Kant, human rights derive directly from unchanging and
immutable sources of truth: God, Nature, Justice, or Reason.  As the drafters of the US
Constitution proclaimed, “We hold these truths to be self-evident…”
According to this view, human rights are by their very nature absolute; they cannot be
subject to political bargaining or economic trade-offs without losing the essential quality
that makes them human rights.  The core principle of human rights is that they are not

1 Garcia, “The Universal Declaration at 50 and the challenge of the Global Markets: Trading Away the
Human Rights Principle,” 25 Brooklyn J. Int’l. Law 51, at 71.
dependent upon, nor should they be subject to, democratic processes such as the majority
vote or utilitarian considerations such as achieving the greatest good for the greatest
number.  It is contrary to the very essence of human rights that a majority should be
allowed to enslave a minority for any reason whatsoever, including the overall benefit of
society as a whole.  The logical corollary of this view is that human rights should take
priority over all other moral, political, or economic claims.
It is tempting to ridicule and dismiss the deontological basis of human rights claims,
especially from an economics perspective.  In a world of finite resources, how can any
claim be considered absolute?  If all human rights are absolute, how can we prioritize
among competing rights?  Should we place those human rights incapable of immediate
realization in an inferior category of rights?  Should we disregard these claims to absolute
priority and subject human rights to the normal trade-offs of cost-benefit analysis?
In seeking answers to these important challenges, it is important to reject two common
but flawed responses.  The first draws a distinction between human rights that are
positive or concrete, and therefore capable of realization and priority, and those that are
negative or abstract, and therefore de-prioritized within existing resource constraints.
The second takes the existing distribution of resources as a given and allocates the
remainder among human rights and other claims, often stripping human rights of any
priority whatsoever.
A.2 Dividing Human Rights
Human rights are often divided into two categories.  Negative/concrete rights do not
require resources for their realization; it is sufficient for duty holders to refrain from
violating them.  Civil and political rights are generally considered in this category.  States
do not need to give us free speech, they merely need to stop preventing us from speaking
freely.  A more nuanced view holds that some, albeit limited, resources are required to
protect negative rights from violation by others.  Positive/abstract rights, on the other
hand, require resources for their fulfillment.  Since resources are always limited, these
rights cannot be realized immediately but only progressively through policies and
practices.  Economic and social rights are generally considered in this category.  States
need to actually provide services like immunizations and facilities like health clinics in
order to guarantee the right to health.  Positive rights cannot therefore make absolute
claims on resources but only relative claims as rights to agreed-upon policies.
The distinction between positive and negative rights has been given legitimacy and legal
sanction through the provision in the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
phrase that its rights are subject to “progressive realization” to the maximum of
“available resources.”  However, this distinction was based not on legal or empirical
rationality but rather on Cold War politics.  The US and the West insisted on separating
civil and political rights from economic and social rights, and downgrading the latter.
But a more accurate way to understand the relationship between rights and resources is
that all human rights have both positive elements that require resources and negative
elements that do not.
This understanding is based on Asbjorn Eide’s typology of human rights duties to
respect, protect and fulfill rights, which correspond to Sen’s typology to respect negative
freedom, protect negative freedom, and fulfill positive freedom (see HDR 2000 paper by
S.R. Osmani).  It is important to add one additional duty to these typologies – the duty to
recognize.  This not only imposes an obligation on states to ratify human rights treaties,
but also on non-state actors to accept human rights responsibilities.  This concept
becomes especially important in the context of international trade law’s refusal to accord
any priority to so-called non-trade values, including human rights.
Although Eide’s typology has gained widespread acceptance in the human rights
movement and beyond, its full implications are not always understood.  The main
purpose of dividing human rights duties into the categories of recognize, respect, protect
and fulfill is to demonstrate the fallacy of viewing civil and political rights as capable of
immediate realization without resources, while ESCR as positive rights requiring state
expenditures and therefore being subject to progressive realization.
Instead Eide argued that all human rights have a negative component requiring little to no
resources (the duty to respect as well as the proposed duty to recognize), a regulatory
component requiring some resources (the duty to protect), and a positive component
requiring significant resources (the duty to fulfill).
The similarities between all human rights can be seen in the following examples.  The
negative component of the right to political participation means that one should not be
prevented from voting through violence or even economic like a high poll tax.  The
regulatory component requires that outside parties should not interfere with the right to
vote, which might require police protection of voting stations and other measures.  The
positive component requires the establishment of institutions and procedures to ensure a
free and fair voting process. The negative component of the right to food means that one
should not be deprived of the means of feeding oneself, for example through land
confiscation.  The regulatory component means that others should not interfere with the
right to vote, which could be paramilitary forces or even development project that
deprives people of tradition food sources.  The positive component requires the
establishment of institutions and procedures to ensure that hunger is eliminated.
It is also worth noting that one of the major methods of protecting negative rights against
infringement by either the state or third parties is through a justice system capable of
providing effective recourse for victims of rights violations.  In many developing
countries, the costs of building an effective judicial system far outweigh the costs of
fulfilling even those rights whose positive enjoyment is considered resource-intensive,
such as rights to health and education.  Thus to be capable of realization in the real world
rather than on paper, even the negative elements of human rights are not capable of
immediate realization unless sufficient resources are allocated.  Does this mean that there
is no such thing as real human rights, because no right is capable of immediate realization
without resources and policies?  Or do only wealthy citizens from wealthy countries have
human rights?
A.3 Human Rights and Resource Constraints
The core principle of human rights holds that every child is born with equal freedom and
dignity.  Yet this is patently untrue, unless we can separate the abstract notion of birth
from the concrete social, economic, and political conditions into which every child is
born.  The lottery of life dictates that some children will die very young from hunger and
preventable disease.  Moreover, this lottery is not random; very poor children will have
the least “enjoyment” of the right to life.
It has long been understood in development circles that the major reason that millions of
children die every year from preventable causes involved the distribution of resources
rather than the availability of resources.  The challenge is applying this truism to our
analysis of human rights and resource constraints.  Do we take the existing unjust
distribution of power and resources as a given?  If so, then those rights that are most
violated, and therefore farthest from concrete realization, would be placed in an inferior
category of rights based not on principles of justice, but rather on surrender to the
enduring reality of structural injustice.  In the US the right to free speech has been
accorded a much high priority than the right to health, not only in the formal legal system
but also in the distribution of resources.  As a result, the right to free speech enjoys
widespread recognition and enforcement, whereas 45 million Americans have no health
care coverage and child mortality in Harlem equals that in Bangladesh.
A corollary challenge lies in the contradiction between espousing a human rights program
that challenges anti-human rights distribution of resources in the present but not the past.
For example, many countries have pursued a policy of wage suppression through
repression of labor rights, with the result that the poorest workers have been unjustly
deprived of significant income.  But for this missing income, their enjoyment of human
rights to food, health and housing would be much better realized.  Similarly, corrupt
governments, encouraged by irresponsible lenders, have squandered billions of dollars in
development aid and contributed to an unsustainable debt that consumes an enormous
share of national resources, leaving little for the fulfillment of people’s fundamental
rights.
In a world of finite resources and unjust distribution of resources, we will inevitably be
forced to make choices even among supposedly absolute human rights priorities.  The
deontological claim of human rights should not be construed as an all-or-nothing demand
that ignores fundamental economic realities.  But while no rights are absolutely absolute,
we should also be careful not to lose the priority value of human rights altogether.	
Constitutional rights do not have absolute value in a domestic legal system, but they do
have the highest priority, and therefore any limits on their enjoyment must be carefully
and narrowly drawn.  Similarly, human rights should sit on top of the hierarchy of
international values and reflect the highest priority for a claim on scarce resources, not to
be lightly overridden based on standard cost-benefits analysis.
It also makes a difference if past violations are accounted for in the present policy
calculus.  For one, it means seeking to redress these effects rather than taking them for
granted, which might lead to different policies on issues like wages and debt.  Second, it
might broaden the concept of priorities and resource constraints, opening space for bolder
thinking on some of the underlying issues.  And third, it might lead to different policies
and priorities regarding those whose rights are routinely violated.
Rather than downgrade the principle of rights for the most deprived and oppressed into
the category of abstract rights to be realized progressively, we might increase our
practical efforts to ensure that their deprivation ends.  In other words, taking the principle
of “all human rights for all people” seriously might require prioritizing certain human
rights-enhancing policies aimed at those who least enjoy them.  In essence, this
constitutes a program of human rights affirmative action, or, to borrow a term from
liberation theology, a preferential option for the rights-poor.  This affirmative action
program might be a useful framework for addressing the need for priorities among human
rights given resource constraints.
B. Human Rights Law
This section provides a brief survey of the development of human rights laws and
standards over the past 50 years.  The major areas of legal development include the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, subsequent international and regional human
rights treaties and declarations, labor rights and the ILO system, and UN declarations on
human rights, including the World Conferences in the 1990s.  The purpose of this section
is not to evaluate these developments or discuss their efficacy, but merely to summarize
the range of human rights laws as they currently exist.  Attached to this paper is a
supplementary annex that describes in more detail the legal framework of ESCR,

including a discussion of content, duties, and violations.  For more information on the
development of human rights law in general, readers are referred to Cees Flinterman’s
paper for HDR 2000, and for more on human rights procedures and enforcement
mechanisms, to Philip Alston’s paper for HDR 1999.
B.1 The Universal Declaration of Human Rights
The Universal Declaration in 1948 is generally taken as the starting point and foundation
of the international human rights regime, although certain categories of rights predated
the Universal Declaration, including labor rights through the International Labor
Organization (ILO), minority rights through the League of Nations, and rights of civilians
in war through Hague laws.  The Universal Declaration was unanimously adopted by the
UN General Assembly (then consisting of 48 states) with great publicity and fanfare.  It
represented a breakthrough in that individuals were recognized as the subjects of rights
for the first time in international law.  Previously states had been the exclusive subjects
and actors of international law.  The Universal Declaration recognized a full range of
civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights, and moreover declared all these
rights to be “interdependent and indivisible.”  It was thus established that indivisible
human rights were the appropriate international vehicle for achieving the goal of human
dignity, and that human dignity required freedom of expression and participation on the
one hand and freedom from poverty and want on the other.
The Universal Declaration did not limit human rights obligations to states, asserting that
all organizations and individuals shared duties to promote the realization of human rights.
This can be seen in Article 28: “the right to a just social and international order.”  While
this article has been ignored in practice, it nonetheless established the principle of
extending human rights duties to non-state actors at the very outset of the human rights
regime.  Moreover, human rights were given priority over other social, economic, and
political goals and policies.  The Preamble stated that human rights were “inalienable”
and inherently derived from the equal dignity and freedom of all human beings.  The
importance of this deontological basis for human rights was discussed in the preceding
section.
B.2 International and Regional Treaties
The adoption of the Universal Declaration set in motion a process of standard-setting
through which the full range of human rights were elaborated in various treaties and
covenants at both the international and regional levels.  The first and arguably most
important of these treaties were the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.  Together with
the Universal Declaration they constitute the International Bill of Rights.  In addition,
international treaties were adopted prohibiting genocide, torture, racial discrimination,
discrimination against women, and abuse of children.  These treaties, which have been
ratified by the vast majority of states, contain a comprehensive listing of rights pertaining
to their respective mandates.  The most recent international treaty, the Convention on the
Rights of the Child, protects the full range of civil, political, economic, social and cultural
rights of children and enjoys near-universal ratification (only the US and Somalia have
thus far failed to ratify it).
Each of the six core international human rights treaties has a treaty body comprised of
independent experts and responsible for monitoring and promoting compliance by states
parties.  These are the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (first
meeting in 1970), the Human Rights Committee (1976), the Committee on the
Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (1982), the Committee on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights (1987), the Committee against Torture (1988), and the
Committee on the Rights of the Child (1991).  The treaty bodies develop human rights
standards and jurisprudence both through specific observations on state parties’
compliance with their legal obligations and through general comments that interpret
broader aspects of human rights norms.  For example, the Committee on ESCR has
issued general comments interpreting and expanding on the rights to housing and food,
the rights of elderly and the disabled, and the impacts of economic sanctions on the
enjoyment of ESCR.
In addition to the international treaties, human rights have also been enshrined in the
treaties of regional systems such as the Organization for Security and Cooperation in
Europe, the European Council, the Organization of American States, and the
Organization of African Unity.  These systems each have human rights treaties, treaty
bodies, and other mechanisms for monitoring and enforcement.  The text of the treaties
generally follows the language found in the international treaties, with some variations
(please refer to HDR 2000 on regional human rights systems).
B.3 The UN Charter and UN Organs
The UN Charter lists among its Fundamental Purposes and Principles in Article 1(3) the
“promotion of human rights and fundamental freedoms.”  In effect, all UN organs and
agencies are charged with human rights responsibility, including standard-setting.  (Their
role in human rights implementation and enforcement is discussed in the next section).
However, the practical involvement of most UN bodies in the development of human
rights laws has been extremely under-developed.
Of the major UN bodies, the Security Council has studiously avoided any role in the
development of human rights norms.  ECOSOC has also played a limited and
unexceptional role, besides the creation of the Committee on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights as the treaty body for that covenant.  The General Assembly is the only
principal organ of the UN to take a central role in promoting human rights law, for
example through passing critical human rights resolutions such as the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights and the Declaration on the Right to Development.
The main responsibility for human rights standard-setting within the UN Charter-based
bodies has fallen on the Commission on Human Rights, primarily through the Sub-
Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities.  The
Commission is comprised of diplomats and political appointees rather than independent
experts, and the previously expert-based Sub-Commission is being increasingly
politicized as states seek more leverage over UN human rights policy.  The Sub-
Commission has passed numerous resolutions elaborating standards and interpretation of
human rights law, and also has commissioned thematic and country-specific reports.  For
example, reports by the Special Rapporteurs for the right to food (A. Eide) and for
economic, social and cultural rights (D. Turk) have made significant contributions to
developing jurisprudence on these rights.  Reports currently being prepared on the right
to development and on extreme poverty hold special interest for the area of human
development.
The UN specialized agencies historically have shown only limited interest in human
rights law, viewing their mandates as more technical and advisory.  This is beginning to
change, however, as evidenced by the widespread, although perhaps still shallow, support
for mainstreaming human rights throughout the UN system.  Leading the way in this
regard is UNICEF, which has made human rights a central element of its mandate since
establishing and promoting the Convention on the Rights of the Child.  Similarly, the
WHO, the FAO, and UNDP have recently become much more active in promoting the
human rights to health, food security, and development respectively.  However, apart
from UNICEF none of the specialized agencies has played a major role in developing or
interpreting rights standards.
B.4 International Declarations
The Universal Declaration is not a treaty, but a resolution passed by the General
Assembly.  Resolutions and declarations are generally considered “softer” law than
treaties because they are not specifically ratified by states and therefore do not impose
binding legal obligations.  The exception is when a resolution is so universally accepted
in word and practice that it becomes part of customary international law, for example, the
Universal Declaration itself.  However, the difference between hard and soft human
rights law is somewhat academic in light of the fact that even legally-binding treaty-
based law lacks even minimally effective enforcement mechanisms, as discussed below.
In 1986 the General Assembly passed the Declaration on the Right to Development as the
culmination of efforts to establish this right in international law.  The Declaration is
lengthy and confusing, but can be summarized as recognizing that all human rights, and
particularly economic, social and cultural rights, must be protected during development
processes.  The Declaration recognizes the right of people and communities to participate
in development processes, but not the right of states to certain levels of development and
aid, as has been claimed by some developing countries.  In this respect, it does not so
much create a “new” right as simply affirm the fundamental importance of all human
rights in the process of sustainable human development.  The Declaration might therefore
be viewed as an early step in what is now called mainstreaming human rights and human
development in the UN system.
The world conferences convened during the 1990s provide another source of “soft”
declaratory human rights law and standards.  These conferences were convened on
various issues including environment and development (Rio in 1992), human rights
(Vienna 1993), women’s rights (Beijing 1995), social development (Copenhagen 1996),
population (Cairo 1997), housing (Istanbul 1997), and food security (Rome 1998).  The
conferences issued declarations with strong emphasis on human rights, as well as
programs of actions with specific benchmarks and targets.  The World Conference in
Vienna was particularly forceful in affirming the interdependence and indivisibility of all
human rights, and in emphasizing the need to give greater consideration to enforcing
ESCR.  The human rights principles asserted in these declarations presently stand as the
latest chapter in a 50-year process of standard setting.
B.5 Criticism of ESCR Standards
As the foregoing survey demonstrates, there is no shortage of human rights laws on the
books today.  But while the era of human rights standard setting may be coming to a
close, there remains a tendency to question the validity of ESCR standards based on their
supposed vagueness and lack of judicial and practical enforceability.  Given the centrality
of ESCR to the concept of human development, this critique will be addressed briefly
before turning to the issue of human rights enforcement.
Traditional human rights lawyers unfamiliar with the field of development often dismiss
ESCR for being too vague and difficult to measure.  While it is true that indicators for
civil and political rights are better developed through years of practical application, there
are methodologies for assessing and comparing socio-economic conditions – the UNDP’s
human development index, UNICEF’s rate of progress measurements, and the World
Bank’s report on World Development Indicators, for example – that could easily be
applied to assessing ESCR violations.   There are volumes of research on socio-economic
conditions (concerning health, education, and other ESCR issues) compiled by academics
and development agencies.  The problem therefore is not the lack of data but the lack of
concrete collaboration between the fields of human rights law and development
economics.
A related argument – that ESCR are not judicially enforceable in the same manner as
civil and political rights – is factually inaccurate.  Many countries have enshrined ESCR
in their constitutions and domestic laws, and as a result, there are numerous examples of
courts adjudicating and enforcing ESCR around the world.  Even in the US, whose legal
system is generally hostile to ESCR, state constitutions generally protect health and
education, for example.  It is certainly not more difficult for a judge to assess violations
of the right to education than to decide anti-trust cases with complex economic data and
evidence.
The fact that ESCR are subject to the “progressive realization” clause has also been used
to argue against their practical enforceability.  But the Committee on ESCR and two
meetings of independent experts (in Limburg in 1986 and Maastricht in 1997) have
provided guidelines for assessing violations of ESCR within the framework of
progressive realization.  In particular, there are three types of ESCR violations that are
not limited by progressive realization.  First are violations based on any form of
discrimination in access to education, health, or other services.  Second are violations
based on the failure to provide a minimum core content of the right, for example free
primary education or basic maternal-child health care.  Third are policies that cause
actual regression in the enjoyment of ESCR. Given that all three types of violations are
regrettably common in almost all states today, we can see that the presumed difficulty of
assessing violations of ESCR has been greatly exaggerated.  For more on these issues,
please refer to the supplementary annex.
The main obstacle to realizing ESCR, and all human rights, has always been and remains
a lack of political will by those holding power in governments, international institutions,
and transnational corporations.
C. Human Rights Enforcement Mechanisms
This section is by necessity brief.  In contrast to the wealth of human rights norms and
standards, there is precious little practical enforcement.  The entire human rights system
relies on voluntary compliance by states, with the occasional public condemnation from a
UN body without any means to enforce compliance with recommendations.  This section
examines the enforcement role of the treaty-based human rights bodies and the UN
Charter-based bodies.  It concludes with a discussion of the human rights paradox in
which absolute deontological values in theory have no practical institutional mechanisms
for enforcement, and therefore in practice the realization of rights has an extremely low
priority in international relations.  This situation is the exact opposite of that prevailing in
international trade law, in which relative utilitarian values enjoy powerful enforcement
mechanisms and near-absolute priority in international relations.
C.1 Treaty-Based Human Rights Bodies and Voluntary Compliance
Under international treaties states are required to report only periodically, generally every
five years, on their progress with compliance.  These reports, when prepared, tend to be
recitations of socio-economic data without any real effort to assess the human rights
impacts of policy.  An expert (though often politicized) treaty monitoring committee
reviews these reports and issues weak recommendations that have no binding effect.
Decisions are arrived at by general consensus, and the relationship to state parties is
usually one of dialogue rather than confrontation.  The treaty bodies issue non-binding
observations with no enforcement mechanism to compel or even encourage fulfillment of
recommendations.  In effect, state parties are expected to engage in voluntary self-
policing of their human rights treaty obligations. Treaty bodies also develop
jurisprudence interpreting human rights through general comments and declarations.
Again, the purpose of these interpretations is to guide state practice and elaborate the
normative concept and content of rights rather than establish enforceable legal
precedents.
Three of the six treaty bodies – the Human Rights Committee, the Committee on the
Elimination of Racial Discrimination, and the Committee against Torture – have an
optional protocol for reviewing individual and inter-state petitions concerning violations
of rights.  This mechanism allows groups to petition the Committee regarding a specific
human rights violation that requires urgent attention, although the Committee still can
only issue non-binding and non-enforceable recommendations.  The protocol must be
ratified by state parties in addition to ratification of the underlying treaty in order to be
effective; few states have availed themselves of this opportunity to face human rights
condemnation.
Reliance on voluntary compliance has produced unimpressive results.  This can be seen
broadly in the persistence of widespread human rights violations committed by almost all
states despite their undertaking solemn international commitments through ratifying
various treaties.  Fifty years after the Universal Declaration, violations of ESCR are
committed with near-total impunity, as states have barely faced rhetorical condemnation
for such violations, let alone enforcement measures.  Even more telling, states have not
even devoted sufficient resources to keeping up with their administrative duties regarding
the international human rights treaties.  For example, the vast majority of state parties to
the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights do not even bother to produce the
required reports every five years, leading the Committee at times to call a delinquent state
party to a session on the strength of NGO reports.
C.2 UN Charter-Based Bodies
The UN’s political organs are mandated to promote human rights awareness at the
broadest level as well as respond to concrete violations of human rights.  In practice,
there are very few mechanisms in the UN system for concrete action on human rights.
The one exception to this rule is also the most controversial.  The Security Council, led
by the US, has recently proclaimed that the right of humanitarian intervention allows it to
intervene politically, economically or militarily in a country in response to a crisis,
including human rights violations.  The controversy arises not only in the fact that this is
a new right with very questionable foundation in international law, but also that it is
applied by the Security Council in a very unbalanced manner.  The selective use of
human rights to intervene in certain crises but not others depending on the target
country’s relationship to the permanent members of the Council undermines the central
human rights principle of universality and deeply politicizes the field.
Among other UN bodies, the Commission on Human Rights was established in 1946, but
it did not begin to monitor major types of human rights violations until the 1980s with the
development of thematic mechanisms and rapporteurs on issues such as disappearances,
summary execution, and torture. The UN system as a whole did not address human rights
issues until the 1970s, when various UN bodies took up the issues of apartheid in South
Africa and self-determination on the Occupied Palestinian Territories.  The UN
Secretariat did not appoint a senior official to head the Centre for Human Rights and
coordinate UN human rights activities until 1994 with the establishment of the Office of
the High Commissioner for Human Rights.  In addition to the failure to seriously address
human rights issues, the UN system has also been hampered by the ad hoc creation of
various bodies and sub-bodies with overlapping human rights mandates and little or no
rational coordination.
Philip Alston has provided a succinct critique of the UN’s human rights system: “the
bottom line is that the UN human rights system consists of disparate, and often only
formally related, bodies with overlapping mandates and different, perhaps sometimes
even inconsistent, approaches.  There has been no grand design, there is built-in
resistance to institutional and procedural reform, and there is reluctance to professionalize
combined with a preference for relying upon diplomats or part-time ‘experts.’”
C.3 Regional Systems and National Institutions
The primary reason that international human rights enforcement is so weak is that the
system lacks concrete judicial mechanisms such as adjudicative bodies that can issue
definitive rulings on human rights violations.  However, at the regional and national
levels there are more judicial mechanisms with greater potential for development than at
the international level.  This paper will only touch on these mechanisms, as several
excellent papers on regional systems and national institutions have already been
submitted to HDR 2000.
Within regional mechanisms, the African system has no formal court procedures, but
both the Latin American and European systems have courts that can hear complaints
against member states and issue binding judgements.  The OAS human rights system	
entails a cumbersome process – only after domestic remedies have been exhausted can a
case be taken up by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, and after
investigation possibly referred to the Inter-American Court on Human Rights.  Moreover,
judgements still rely on voluntary compliance for implementation given the lack of
regional political will to enforce Court decisions.  The European Court is the most
advanced both in its jurisprudence in interpreting the European Social Charter and also in
the respect that its decisions are accorded within the European system.  Although the
Court lacks specific enforcement capacity such as sanctions, states will generally
implement an adverse decision rather than risk political isolation in the region.  An
example is the Court's recent decision that the British ban on gay soldiers serving in the
military violates human rights and must be changed.
Perhaps the most effective method of enforcing human rights is through national
institutions linked to fully applicable domestic laws and procedures.  While these
institutions are a relatively new development, they appear to offer promise for
incorporating international human rights norms through domestic judicial systems.  From
the global perspective of universal applicability, the major flaw in national institutions is
precisely that they are subject to national political will.  Since human rights must often be
enforced against recalcitrant state parties, it is unlikely that major violators will
voluntarily establish and then respect domestic human rights institutions.
C.4 The Human Rights Paradox
Over the past 50 years, a wide range of human rights norms and principles have been
established and even celebrated.  These principles are meant to represent the highest
values in the international system, the end goals of all policy-making, the very raison
d'être of interstate and intrastate relations.  States sign human rights treaties in full public
view with great pomp and circumstance, thereby incurring obligations to recognize,
respect, protect and fulfill human rights.  In the areas of standard-setting, human rights
education, technical and advisory services, and other cooperative efforts, the field of
human rights has made significant strides relations with states, as well as developing
human rights institutions within states.  But in the critical area of implementation, the
international community has proven entirely unwilling to hold itself accountable to

human standards through effective enforcement mechanisms that assess violations and
punish violators.  In other words, tremendous effort and resources have been allocated to
developing human rights standards and discourse, but almost none to making these rights
meaningful in the daily lives of human beings.  In this way, the rhetoric and reality of
human rights are almost completely delinked.
The impetus for all progress in monitoring and protecting human rights over the past
decades has come from "below" through people’s movements fighting for social justice
and civil society groups seeking to raise public awareness of rights violations and compel
governments to fulfill their legal commitments.  While public activism and pressure is a
positive and necessary component of human rights enforcement, the current exclusive
reliance on such means merely indicates the weakness of institutional enforcement in the
international system.  To effectively promote human rights accountability and
implementation, civil society participation should be channeled through established
international human rights judicial procedures and enforcement mechanisms.
The fundamental paradox is that human rights make universal and absolute deontological
claims on global and national policies, with strong public support, but without any
institutional means for implementation.  In practice, the absolute claim of human rights is
entirely vitiated by the relative and voluntary nature of institutional enforcement.  Human
rights therefore make little difference in the lives of human beings.  A cynic might argue
that the pomp and ceremony around human rights only serve to mask and legitimize the
real practice of human rights violations that occur in every corner of the world.  The
human rights paradox is even more telling when compared to international trade law,
which makes relative claims on international policies and resources, excludes public
participation and enjoys minimal civil society support, yet enjoys extremely powerful
enforcement mechanisms that ensure the near-absolute implementation of trade norms
and principles.
II. INTERNATIONAL TRADE
This chapter provides an overview of the international trade regime.  It consists of three
sections: trade values and philosophy, the development of trade law and institutions, and
the enforcement of trade rules through the WTO.
This chapter illustrates the ways in which international trade law contradicts the
neoclassical economic rationale upon which it purports to be based and contends that the
current trade regime has successfully delinked the means of trade from the welfare
maximizing ethical purposes of trade, substituting different end goals such as maximizing
short-term corporate profits. That liberalization in the WTO model does not lead to
welfare maximization is amply illustrated by enormous and growing global disparities in
wealth, income, health standards and access to technology
This chapter also documents the evolution of the rules and institutions governing the
international trading system, focusing mainly on the formation of the WTO.  It
emphasizes the uneven access which various actors in the international arena are afforded
to decision-making processes in the trade regime and examines the marginalization of
human rights, labor rights and environmental concerns in international trade.
A. Trade Values and Philosophy
This section explores modern trade law in theory and practice, including the neoclassical
economic theory upon which the trade regime is purportedly based.  This section also
examines theoretical and practical difficulties in trade law which include contradictions
between neoliberal economic assumptions and real world conditions as well as
discrepancies between international trade law and the neoliberal model.  Finally, this
section reveals the pivotal influence of major TNCs in creating the current free market
extremism and the disastrous human consequences of trade liberalization.
A.1 Maximizing Welfare
The neoliberal model of economics, supposedly the foundation of international trade law,
is based on classical utilitarian theory.  Utilitarianism can be summarized as a model that
seeks the greatest good for the greatest number of people without valuing any other end
goals as such (i.e. human rights, freedom, development).  The means are inseparable from
the ends, and moreover constantly shift according to the calculus of the day.  In this
respect utilitarianism is diametrically opposed to deontological theories like human
rights, in which the ends are universal and absolute.  For example, utilitarian theory does
not automatically condemn enslaving a minority of the population to serve the needs of
the majority if aggregate welfare is thereby maximized.
The current neoliberal economic version of utilitarianism – the axiom that a rising tide
lifts all boats – seeks in theory to achieve the most welfare for the most people by
maximizing the aggregate of individual utilities expressed through consumer preference
in a free and open market where firms compete in a level playing field according to
universal rules.  Essential assumptions underlying this theory are that individuals seek to
maximize their profits or utilities, that they have access to full information, and that the
invisible hand of the market works to level the playing field and provide perfect
competition.  Proponents of this free trade model argue that it maximizes such utilities as
consumer choice, lower prices, increased employment, enhanced economies of scale,
specialization, increased competition, the accelerated diffusion of the fruits of innovation,
and, most importantly, the aggregate welfare of humanity.
The clearest example of neoliberal utilitarian economics -- at least in theory -- is the
recent emergence of international trade law.  Trade law has focused almost exclusively in
terms of a normative framework on achieving efficiency through removing barriers to the
free flow of capital and goods.  This means that values other than efficient commercial
exchanges are viewed as outside the scope of, and even hostile to, the purposes and
vision of trade law.  There is no allowance for deontological ends such as human dignity
or the preservation of the environment, no value placed on safe and healthy working
conditions or a pollution-free environment.  According to this view, human rights and
environmental concerns are at best irrelevant and at worst disguised protectionism that
actually threaten the goal of efficiency.  Goods produced by destroying workers’ lives or
depleting nonrenewable resources are still counted as growth and value creation within
the framework of maximizing utilities.  Externalities are excluded from the economic
calculus and therefore also from policy formation supposedly aimed at maximizing
aggregate welfare.
Defenders of free trade insist that welfare goals such as human rights and human
development will be achieved as automatic and inevitable results of trade liberalization
and free markets.  But crucially, these welfare goals find no formal recognition in the
legal and regulatory framework of international trade.  The means and ends of free trade
are thereby inextricably linked in theory but delinked in practice.  They are not inscribed
into binding laws with corresponding commitments and practical obligations.  The legal
framework recognizes only the means of free trade – liberalization, lowering of trade
barriers, opening access for capital and investment – not the normative values of welfare
maximization that are supposed to flow inevitably from such means.  The ideological
coherence and practical viability of international trade is therefore predicated on ensuring
a perfect fit, or at least a close correlation, between trade law's legally-binding means of
trade liberalization and the “inevitable” welfare maximizing end goals of human
development.
A.2 Theoretical and Practical Difficulties in Trade Law
There are two significant flaws in the current international trade model.  First is that the
neoliberal economic theory on which trade law is supposedly based does not conform to
real world conditions and therefore its conclusions about which economic policies
produce welfare maximization are not valid.  But more importantly, trade law in its
current form is not even faithful to this neoliberal model but includes numerous
distortions based on delinking the means of trade from the welfare maximizing ethical
purposes of trade, and substituting different set of end goals, primarily related to
maximizing short-term corporate profits.
The more extreme forms of neoclassical economic theory have been largely discredited
within the field of economics for relying on assumptions that do not correspond to
present realities.  Adam Smith and David Ricardo, considered the founding fathers of this
theory, assumed that goods could cross borders but not capital or labor, as was the case in
their day.  Smith based his theory of the invisible hand on a conviction that large markets
and labor division and specialization were key to growth, and that these required free and
open markets.  Ricardo amended this by basing the international division of labor on
comparative not absolute advantage, leading each country to specialize in producing
certain products more cheaply and efficiently than others.  But their theories simply do
not apply under current circumstances given the fact that capital has become the most
mobile factor in international trade.  Indeed, Ricardo emphasized that if capital were also
mobile then trade between countries would be governed not by the law of comparative
advantage but by the labor theory of value (absolute advantage in terms of labor costs).  It
follows that true free trade would require ending restrictive immigration policies that
confine labor within national borders while capital and goods are free to move.
It is also worth noting that both Smith and Ricardo were moral philosophers as well as
economists.  Maximizing human welfare was the essential purpose of their economic
theories, not merely an afterthought.  Today, the dominant discourse in international trade
emphasizes the values of free trade and open markets as ends in themselves, without
corresponding emphasis on the underlying welfare values.  This narrow-minded focus
was criticized in a prescient UN study produced almost 40 years ago: “One of the greatest
dangers in development policy lies in the tendency to give to the more material aspects of
growth an overriding and disproportionate emphasis.  The end may be forgotten in
preoccupation with the means.  Human rights may be submerged and human beings seen
only as instruments of production rather than free entities for whose welfare and cultural
advance the increased production is intended… Even where there is recognition of the
fact that the end of all economic development is … the growth and well-being of the
individual and larger freedom, methods of development may be used which are a denial
of basic human rights.”
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It is ironic that a warning applicable to centralized statist methods of trade and
production, which emphasizes materials over human considerations, should now be
leveled at the global capitalist trade system.  This is the result of delinking what are
called trade values such as liberalization and open markets from non-trade values such as








empirical fact that trade law and practice has enormous and perhaps decisive impacts on
supposedly non-trade issues such as labor standards, health, education, standard of living,
and protection of the environment.
It is also difficult to reconcile with recent trends in the fields of human rights and
development.  The UN system has moved towards economic concepts and practices that
place human beings at the center of development.  The interlinked norms of sustainable
development, human development, human rights, and the right to development have
gained increasing currency in the theory and even the practice of UN bodies and
agencies.  Economists such as Amartya Sen have returned to moral philosophy and ethics
as the root of economic theory and practice.  The human rights movement increasingly
recognizes the fallacy of dividing civil and political rights from economic, social and
cultural rights, and the damage to human welfare of neglecting the latter rights entirely.
Poverty is now understood as “a violation of basic human rights standards” according to
the UNDP.
3  It has become almost a truism that all forms of economic activity -- whether
trade, aid, investment, or development -- should be aimed at enabling human beings to
reach their full potential.
But this only makes the international trade regime’s exclusive reliance on an extreme and
discredited form of neoliberal economic theory all the more surprising.  In an age of
increasing connections between trade, human rights, development, how is it that trade
law and practice have come to be delinked from mainstream views in the field of
economics and in the broader UN system? What accounts for the narrow ideological view
prevailing in such a crucial policy-making arena?  What are the concrete outcomes and
impacts of delinking trade and human rights?
A.3 Influence of Major TNCs
The most powerful force pushing the current free market extremism is the influence of
major TNCs in the development of the global trade rules.  It is generally understood that
“comparative advantage, international competitiveness, and the international division of
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labor result in large measure from corporate trade strategies and national policies.”
4  Yet
this factor is largely overlooked in academic and professional writing about international
trade and its impacts, perhaps because it seems like a case of restating the obvious.
Without an explicit acknowledgement of the role of TNCs, it is difficult to analyze why
the trade law regime goes beyond even the most conservative schools of neoliberal
economics despite the absence in the global economy of key theoretical pre-conditions
regarding choice, competition, information, level playing field, etc.
It is an open secret that global trade institutions are heavily penetrated and influenced by
the world’s largest corporations.  These powerful actors, with revenues larger than many
state budgets, have established permanent and constant lobbying at the WTO, IMF,
World Bank, and OECD, not to mention the trade missions of Northern governments.
Most cases before WTO are brought by governments in response to pressure from major
corporations.  More significantly, corporate lobbyists have played a key role in drafting
the actual texts of various global trade agreements.  James Robinson, Chairman of
American Express, was President Reagan's chief advisor in the early stages of the
Uruguay Round, which happened to include an agreement deregulating banking services.
Daniel Amstutz, Vice President of Cargill (one of the world’s largest agribusiness firms),
drafted the initial version of the Agreement on Agriculture in the Uruguay Round.
Lobbyists for major pharmaceutical company played a central role in drafting TRIPS,
which mandates US-style patent rights globally.
The role and interests of international business can also be seen in the example of the
International Chamber of Commerce.  The most powerful international business lobby,
the ICC is composed of major TNCs including GM, Novartis, Nestle, and McDonalds.
The ICC recently embarked on a major campaign to establish “an effective regulatory
framework for globalization,” with impressive results.  A 1998 meeting between the ICC
and senior UN officials, including Kofi Annan, issued a joint declaration calling on the
UN and the private sector to “forge a close global partnership to secure greater business
input into the world’s economic decision-making.”  ICC Secretary General Maria







international business has changed fundamentally.  The shift towards a stance more
favorable to business is being nurtured from the very top.”
5  Helmut Maucher, ICC
President, is now seeking formal status within the WTO.  “We want to be neither to be
the secret girlfriend of the WTO nor have to use the servants’ entrance.”  He added that
“governments have to understand that business is not just another pressure group but a
resource that will help them set the right rules.”
6
This focus on TNCs and the WTO is not meant to obscure the role of other important
factors and actors in global trade, such as national policy-making in developed countries
and the international trade institutions themselves.  While all these forces represent in
varying degrees the interests of the powerful and wealthiest sectors of international
society, TNCs directly express these interests without countervailing pressure, such as
democratic opinion and public pressure (in the case of many governments).  And the
WTO is the preeminent enforcement mechanism in international trade, indeed in all of
international law.  Nevertheless, TNCs and the WTO is simply integral components of a
larger international economic system in which developed countries have been literally
compelled to adopt structural adjustment programs that slash public sector spending, re-
orient industry and agriculture towards export to service debt, and tighten credit and the
money supply, and eliminate barriers to foreign investment and trade.
There is, however, one crucial difference between TNCs and the WTO.  TNCs represent
only their own interest in profit maximization, whereas the WTO is meant to represent
the interests of all member nations, and their populations, in gaining the supposed welfare
of trade liberalization.  It stands to reason that TNCs should seek global rules of trade that
heighten their competitive advantage, increase their market share, and maximize their
profits.  After all, corporations are supposed to maximize profits as part of the fiduciary
duty owed to shareholders.  It is their job, their bottom line, their raison d'être.  And
international trade law, administered by global trade institutions like the WTO, is the best
way to accomplish this basic objective.
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But it does not stand to reason that corporate interests should exercise predominant
influence in a global organization charged with enforcing universal rules of free trade in
the interests of all humanity.  Traditional neoliberal economics theory posits that free and
open trade provides the greatest benefit to the greatest number of people.  The WTO
model of corporate-managed free trade raises an important practical variant of this issue:
is what is best for Cargill and Monsanto best for all of us?
A.4 Impacts of Trade Ideology
If across-the-board trade liberalization really does maximize the general welfare, then
criticism of international trade law from a normative human rights perspective would
have to be significantly tempered.  Before examining this empirical assumption, it is
worth recalling that current trade law does not in fact mandate strict liberalization, but
rather retains protections favored by developed countries.  For example, developed
countries do not adopt as domestic policy the austerity medicine prescribed for
developing countries and the international system as a whole.  Instead public sector
spending on unemployment assistance, social security, health care, education, and other
basic social services is still provided, not to mention direct subsidies and other trade
protections for important and strategic sectors like agriculture and textiles.
Assessing free trade's concrete impacts on human welfare is an enormously complex
empirical undertaking that is beyond the scope of this paper.  However, even a brief
survey of this issue is sufficient to underscore the point that trade liberalization is not
always the best policy from the perspective of welfare maximization or human rights.
It must first be understood that the trade law regime is making a very strong claim,
namely that liberalization in the WTO model always leads to welfare maximization, and
is the best policy for all countries regardless of their specific contexts.  The irony is that
free markets and liberalization are treated as absolute values in the WTO trade system,
notwithstanding the general skepticism of economists for absolute values in a world of
limited resources and multiple policy contexts.  If free markets only maximized welfare
in certain situations or certain countries, then it would not be acceptable to have blanket
universal rules promoting free markets as the highest legal and political value in the	
regime.  Rather, a different set of goals -- universal human rights, for example -- should
then be substituted as the highest values in the system, with free trade being one possible
(non-exclusive) means of achieving these goals depending on the situation.
The strong claim of international trade law is impossible to sustain.  Rather than review
the wealth of data on the impacts of globalization, the reader is referred to UNDP Human
Development reports over the past ten years.  These detail the enormous and growing
disparities in wealth, income, health standards, access to technology, and other issues,
with the richest sectors of all societies capturing the lion’s share of the enormous wealth
generated since the end of the Cold War, even if the bottom quintile has shown marginal
aggregate improvement.  In particular, the reader is referred to papers prepared for the
1999 HDR (Tokel & Klein, Whalley, Khor).  These papers demonstrate that trade
liberalization has been a mixed blessing in Latin America and other regions, with some
successes and some failures, with increasing poverty and unemployment in certain
countries, and with the persistence of absolute poverty throughout the world.  Numerous
UN and independent reports have demonstrated the free trade and structural adjustment
programs have winners, usually concentrated in the wealthy sectors of developing
countries, and many more losers.  For example, UNCTAD’s 1997 Trade and
Development Report found that almost all countries that have undertaken rapid trade
liberalization have seen unemployment grow and wages drop for unskilled workers.
It is extremely difficult to reconcile the brutal facts of poverty – millions of children die
of hunger and preventable disease every year while the wealth of the richest corporations
and individuals rises exponentially  – with a global trade system that truly maximizes
welfare for the greatest number of people.  And it is impossible to reconcile these
conditions with respect for human rights and human development.  Even if one argued
that economic shock now will lead to welfare maximization down the road, human rights
does not permit the sacrifice of this generation of children for the next (not to mention
Keynes’s comment about the long run).
The empirical conclusion that international trade and free market globalization have not
achieved welfare maximization and respect for human rights, and in some cases have
harmed these values, leads to a theoretical conclusion that delinking the means of free

trade from the ends of human development has failed to achieve its stated goals and
expected outcomes.  The priority must therefore be on finding practical alternatives to
reconcile economic efficiency and other free trade principles with respect for human
rights and human development as the goal of all economic activities, including trade.
B. Development of Trade Law and Institutions
This section reviews the evolution of modern trade law and institutions, primarily the
ITO and the GATT system, whose Uruguay Round culminated in the formation of the
WTO.  The section examines the decision-making processes of the GATT, the various
trade issues which the eight GATT Rounds legislated and the creation of the GATT
dispute resolution mechanism.  This section analyzes the Uruguay Round, key provisions
of the WTO and the limited capacity of developing countries to influence decisions of the
WTO.  As was evidenced at the recent Ministerial meeting in Seattle, these countries are
now expressing strong opposition to the lack of balance and fairness in the WTO system.
B.1 Overview
The transformation of the global economy has proceeded very rapidly in the decade since
the end of the Cold War.  The term globalization has become common parlance
throughout the world to describe the changes in international relations and economy.  At
the risk of simplification, globalization can be understood as the process of integrating
local and national economies into a global system with relatively unimpeded capital and
trade flows spurred by new communications technologies and a universal legal
framework promoting free and open market access.
While there is little question that globalization has changed the face of international
affairs, it is important to distinguish between the different impacts of two types of
globalization -- transactional and regulatory.  Transactional globalization refers to the
increasing volume of trade involving capital, goods, and services crossing national
boundaries.  While there has always been international trade, the amount and integration
of trade flows today dwarfs trade of the past.  Yet many commentators, including US
Treasury Secretary Lawrence Summers, argue that these changes are more incremental
than revolutionary.
It is harder to take issue with the revolutionary nature of changes taking place in
regulatory globalization.  In the past ten years, and especially the last five, an entirely
new legal framework has come to govern the field of international trade, complete with a
host of new agreements and powerful new institutions like the WTO to monitor and
enforce these rules.  The field of international law has never seen such rapid changes in
so short a time.  According to a prominent international jurist, "It is plausible to suggest
that ninety percent of international law work is in reality international economic law in
some form or another."
7
Moreover, international economic law, and specifically trade law, have come to
overshadow and supercede a host of international law fields related to labor, human
rights, development, and the environment.  As discussed below, the reach of trade law
extends into all these fields without any acknowledgement of the legal principles that
have governed and regulated these fields since even before World War II.  In addition,
trade law is enforced through increasingly powerful disciplinary mechanisms that
constrain the policy options of states.  The profound impacts of limiting popular
advocacy and national policy in areas of human rights, development and the environment
have been felt in all corners of the globe.  Unlike the quantitative changes of transactional
globalization, many commentators argue that regulatory globalization can aptly be
described as revolutionary:
"From its imperfect beginning in the GATT 1947 to its current apotheosis in the WTO,
the revolution in IEL means that more aspects of the international economy are regulated
through treaty-based rules than at any previous time, rules with less room for state
discretion and unilateral action than at any prior time, and under the adjudicative
supervision of stronger institutions than at any other time."
8
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B.2 The ITO and the GATT
The International Trade Organization (ITO) was expected to be the lynchpin of the
Bretton Woods system, administering a comprehensive code to govern the conduct of
world trade.  The ITO was to be the executive organ of the system, coordinating
international economic policy with the IMF and the World Bank.  Its purview extended
beyond trade in goods to cover services, investment rules, commodity agreements, and
encouraging full employment practices.  In this sense the ITO had a broader mandate and
philosophical underpinning than its successor, the WTO, with its narrow focus on
economic liberalization.
However, US refusal to ratify the Havana Charter despite playing an active role in
negotiations doomed the ITO.  As an alternative, 23 of the 50 countries involved in the
failed ITO negotiations agreed to establish the GATT as a multilateral trade agreement to
reduce and bind tariffs.  While the GATT initially began as a set of global rules with
weak enforcement and minimal oversight bureaucracy, its legal and institutional
framework expanded gradually through eight successive “Rounds” of multilateral
negotiations between members.
GATT historically has operated under a system of consensus decision-making.  Under the
consensus system, a single vote against a decision was sufficient to negate its effect.  The
area most affected by the consensus system was the dispute resolution mechanism, since
the losing party in a dispute could always block implementation of the dispute panel's
decision.  This greatly hampered the development of an effective enforcement
mechanism for resolving disputes.  However, the consensus system did not constrain the
general rules-making authority of the GATT since most major decisions were taken by
the powerful industrial countries and then presented to the membership for ex post facto
ratification.  The United States, Europe, Canada and Japan, referred to as the Quad

















There was no progress on dispute resolution mechanisms until the Tokyo Round in 1979,
when rules were formalized in the 1979 Understanding Regarding Notification,
Consultation, Dispute Settlement, and Surveillance.  However, parties still lacked the
right to resort to panel proceedings or to have panel reports adopted.  Any GATT member
could still block any decision.  In 1991 Arthur Dunkel, Director-General of the WTO,
proposed a draft agreement on dispute resolution with the right to a panel and to adoption
of the panel report, the right to appeal to an Appellate Body, and the right to take
enforcement measures against non-compliance.  This draft became the basis for the
WTO’s dispute mechanisms adopted under the Uruguay Round in 1994.
Until the Uruguay Round GATT rules covered only tariffs on merchandise goods.  The
developed countries, which exercised dominant influence in GATT despite the formal
requirement of consensus, were very careful to create exceptions under GATT to the
overall trend of tariff reduction in order to protect sectors vulnerable to competition from
developing countries.  This was most evident in the protective barriers and trade
distorting measures like subsidies that the US and Europe maintained for agriculture,
especially products like sugar and tobacco where production in developing countries was
cheaper.  Another example was the 1961 agreement by developed countries to impose
discriminatory restrictions on low cost imports in clothing and textiles.  This protectionist
framework was expanded and institutionalized in the Multi-Fiber Arrangement of 1974.
Another component of developed country protections was the accepted use of so-called
voluntary export restraints and orderly marketing arrangements to safeguard against
import surges, almost always from developing countries.  Developed countries, especially
the US, still use anti-dumping measures permitted by the WTO to limit competition from
developing countries.
The history of developed country protectionism is important to keep in mind when
examining free trade issues under the WTO.  Manipulation of GATT rules by developed
countries is one of the primary reasons that developing countries insist on reforms and
“special” treatment in order to level the playing field, and also why they resist the
introduction into the WTO of additional measures that might be abused by developed
countries as disguised protectionism, such as labor and environmental standards
(discussed below).
B.3 Uruguay Round
The most far-reaching changes in the GATT, especially in terms of laws and regulations,
came with the Uruguay Round from 1986-94.   The UR was the longest and most
comprehensive round of negotiations ever undertaken through the GATT.  Agreement
was delayed for years due to disagreements between the US and the EU, mostly on
agriculture.  These disagreements were finally hammered out at the Blair House Accord
in 1992, after which the Quad countries quickly reached agreement on major issues such
as establishing the WTO, binding tariffs, opening market access, eliminating non-tariff
barriers to trade, and drafting new multilateral agreements covering additional good and
services in the GATT system. The speed with which major decisions and policies were
taken after the US and EU resolved their differences demonstrates how the powerful
industrial countries actually dominate the supposedly consensus-based decision-making
process of the GATT.  The UR concluded with the Marrakesh Agreement in 1994, signed
by 123 countries.
The UR established the WTO and its Charter as the institutional framework missing from
the international trade regime since the ITO was rejected in 1948.  The UR also separated
the trade law regime of GATT from the role of monitoring and enforcing trade rules
through the WTO.  The UR extended the application of GATT rules from tariffs on
merchandise goods to non-tariff barriers on a whole range of goods and services through
the adoption of new multilateral agreements under the WTO umbrella.  The UR also
reversed the decision-making process on disputes to an anti-consensus system, meaning
that WTO decisions, including dispute resolution panel findings, would be automatically
adopted unless opposed by all members, even the winning party to the dispute.  Finally,
the UR adopted the principle of a Single Undertaking, whereby all WTO members agreed
to abide by all agreements instead of being free to ratify selected agreements as before.
These changes have had a dramatic impact on the GATT system, transforming it into a
powerful institutional mechanism for enforcing a growing body of global trade laws.
The main new multilateral agreements negotiated in the UR in addition to the GATT are
the Trade-Related Intellectual Property Agreement (TRIPS), the Agreement on Sanitary
and Phytosanitary Standards (SPS), and the General Agreement in Trade and Services
(GATS).
TRIPS sets enforceable global rules on patents, copyrights and trademarks through US-
style intellectual property laws granting monopoly sales rights to patent holders for an
extended period.  The pharmaceutical industry was very influential with Quad countries
during the drafting of the agreement.  Many developing countries objected to TRIPS
entering the WTO system yet lacked the resources, expertise, and political will to
withstand the pressure from developed countries.  They argue that TRIPS is a
protectionist device that maintains and increases the monopoly power exercised by
Northern TNCs and hinders technology transfer to and development in the South.   In
addition, many civil society groups have objected to TRIPS Article 27.3b that allows the
patenting of life forms and encourages the appropriation of traditional knowledge through
manipulation of the patent process, damaging the environment and threatening the
livelihood of traditional farming communities.  The impact of TRIPS has already been
felt in many developing countries, such as India, Argentina and Brazil, which have had to
annul laws protecting local pharmaceutical companies or ensuring the affordability of
lifesaving drugs.
SPS regulates government policies relating to food and health safety standards to ensure
that they do not pose non-tariff barriers to free trade.  The WTO has appointed the Codex
Alimentarius, a standards-setting agency of the UN Food and Agriculture Organization,
as the arbiter for global food standards under the SPS.  The Codex is heavily influenced
by corporate interests -- Nestles has more personnel representing different countries'
governments that has any one government.  Developing countries fear that their food and
safety standards will be judged lacking under SPS, whereas Northern NGOs are
concerned that national standards in their countries will be eroded.  In the Beef Hormone
case (1998), a WTO dispute panel interpreted SPS to support an American challenge
against the EU’s ban on the sale of beef with artificial growth hormones.  Finding the ban
an unfair restriction on trade in the absence of clear scientific evidence of the danger, the
panel required the EU to open its markets to hormone-treated beef or face countervailing
duties amounting to over $500 million.  This ruling directly contradicts the Precautionary
Principle, a key environmental norm that permits restrictions on potentially harmful
products unless there is clear scientific evidence that they do not pose a danger.  Based on
the same reasoning, the labeling of GMOs may no longer be allowed under the SPS.
GATS covers trade in goods and services so that almost all international transactions are
now included in the WTO umbrella.  Previously the service sector was considered a local
and national industry, but with the advent of global communications, large TNCs have
come to dominate areas such as banking, insurance, telecommunications, and data
management.  Financial services are not completely within GATS, and developed
countries have contemplated further deregulation.  But many developing countries and
civil society groups have objected to what they view as a back door means of inserting
provisions from the rejected Multilateral Agreement on Investments (MAI).
In addition, an agreement on government procurement was negotiated in the UR
prohibiting governments from using “non-economic” considerations in procurement,
such as affirmative action and environmental concerns.  Unlike the other multilateral
agreements, the procurement agreement is subject to voluntary ratification and currently
covers 26 countries.
The UR introduced fundamental changes into the GATT system with virtually no public
consultation or understanding of the implications of the WTO and its covered
agreements.  Even developing countries that signed the Marrakesh Agreement had little
awareness of the constraints that the UR would place on national decision-making in
critical areas of economic policy and social development.  As these impacts have become
more clear over the past few years, that has been a strong backlash among developing
countries against what they perceive to be the unbalanced playing field created by the
Uruguay Round agreements.  This explains the widespread support for the call by
Guyana, as Chair of the Group of 77, that the Seattle meeting of the WTO focus on
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Created in 1995 under the UR, the WTO separated the institutional framework of trade
from the substantive rules embodied in GATT and other multilateral trade agreements
such as GATS, TRIPS, and SPS.  The WTO currently has 134 members (over 90 of
whom are developing and least developed countries) and 33 observer nations, with 30
more applying for accession, including China.  To be accepted, countries must make
specific commitments to liberalize and open their economies and to abide by trade
agreements administered by the WTO.  The Quad countries, and especially the US,
exercise decisive influence in deciding what countries get admitted and under what terms,
as demonstrated in the case of China.
The WTO describes itself as a member-driven consensus-based in organization.  While in
principle the WTO is one country one vote, the tradition of consensus from GATT
remains, to the benefit of the powerful Northern countries.  In the text, a two-thirds
majority is required to amend agreements and admit new members, and a three-quarters
majority is required to adopt major interpretations of agreements.  In reality, however, the
rules of the global economy are written in closed-door meetings of the Quad countries,
often with the input and participation of major corporate interests.  Decisions are then
presented for acceptance to the rest of the members, who are pressured or induced
through concessions in the form of special and differential treatment (S&D) into
accepting.  As discussed below, developing countries anyway lack the resources and
technical expertise to participate fully in the negotiating process, although the Seattle
meeting witnesses a newly-assertive stance on the part of developing countries as they
effectively resisted Northern attempts to inject new issues like labor standards into the
WTO framework.
The official operating principles of the WTO are:
•   Non-discrimination among trading nations (MFN) or between national and foreign
goods and services (national treatment).
•   International trade should become progressively freer through agreements that
obligate countries to eliminate barriers to foreign goods, services, and investment.
•   Global rules will make international trade predictable and improve conditions for fair
economic competition by lowering barriers and prohibiting practices like subsidies
and dumping.
•   Rules should be more favorable for developing countries, giving them transition
periods to adjust to new rules and special privileges.
GATT, GATS, TRIPS and SPS incorporate the principles of MFN and national
treatment.  The principle of MFN in Article I mandates that some WTO members cannot
be treated better or worse than others with respect to “like products.”  Identical
preferential treatment must be extended to all WTO members.  In the Belgian Family
Allowances Case (1953), one of the first decided in GATT dispute settlement, a panel
considered a Belgian measure that imposed additional tax on products from countries that
did not have a system of family allowances.  Norway and Denmark challenged the tax as
a violation of MFN and won.  Article III’s national treatment standard allows countries to
impose regulatory requirements on imported products only as long as they are treated no
less favorably than like domestic products.  Although this would seem to allow a country
with high labor or environmental standards to insist that imported like products be
produced under similar conditions, WTO panels (in the Tuna-Dolphin cases) have ruled
that the production process by which a product is made is irrelevant in the determination
of like products.  Of course, this narrow interpretation of trade rules would reject any
trade-based restrictions motivated by the human, labor or environmental rights
implications of the production process.
B.5 Developing Countries in the WTO
It is widely recognized that developing countries, which comprise the vast majority of
WTO members, lack the resources and expertise to participate in the WTO's complex
rule-making and dispute resolution procedures.  The WTO's response has been to provide
certain benefits to developing countries, such as providing transition periods to
implement trade liberalization, enacting rules to improve market access for these
countries through the Generalized System of Preferences (nonreciprocal, and
nondiscriminatory preferences for developing country exports), and requiring countries to	
consider the negative impacts of safeguards and anti-dumping measures (largely enacted
by the US and EU).
However, most developing countries argue that they have derived little benefit from the
WTO system thus far and have not been provided with the resources and technical
assistance to participate adequately.  Rather than help level the playing field, they
complain that the supposedly rules-based WTO actually maintains Northern privilege and
power while failing to address the structural obstacles to Southern development.  They
have called for broad reforms of the WTO system based on the principle of “free trade
plus aid.”  Proposed reforms include:
•   Support developing countries with resources and technical assistance to participate in
negotiations and dispute settlements.
•   Include all WTO members in negotiations and drafting rather than rely on exclusive
groups like the Quad countries.
•   Provide trade adjustment assistance to help developing countries cope with the social
dislocation of implementing trade rules.
•   Provide Most Favored Pricing to ensure that TNCs do not take advantage of
monopolies (often through TRIPS) to charge higher prices in developing countries
that can least afford them.
•   Protect food security though exemptions on trade liberalization relating to domestic
production of foodstuffs.
One of the main trade reforms demanded by developing countries is technology transfer
and technical assistance focused on three critical areas in which capacity is lacking:
negotiations, implementation, and infrastructure.
Developing countries have limited capacity to negotiate because their trade missions are
understaffed and lack resources and expertise.  Many countries have a single official in
Geneva representing interests at the WTO, WHO, ILO, and other UN agencies.  Almost
half of the 42 African members do not even have a single representative in Geneva.  In
contrast, developed countries have large staffs with infrastructure of technical support
often supplied by corporations.  There is a need for a technical assistance fund and/or an

office in Geneva to provide resources for technical and legal advice to developing
countries on negotiations, drafting agreements, dispute settlements, and other WTO
issues.
In terms of implementation, the World Bank has estimated that the LDCs would have to
have to allocate an entire year’s development budget in order to implement reforms to
make the UR trade rules functional.  These include reforms in sanitary standards
intellectual property practices, customs valuation and import licensing, and other issues.
These rules were based on the existing laws in place in most developed countries and
therefore impose no additional burdens on these countries.  Related to implementation is
the lack of infrastructure capacity of developing countries.  Economic infrastructure
(transportation, communications, border controls) and social infrastructure (education,
technology, skills training) have always been linked to public sector investment, which
has plummeted in developing countries as a result of the debt burden, structural
adjustment programs, and decline in foreign aid.
In addition to transfer of knowledge and capacity, developing countries have requested
aid for trade adjustment assistance to workers displaced by changing trade patterns.
These include unemployment benefits, job training and education, and other benefits
commonly provided in developed countries.  The WTO makes no provision for providing
trade adjustment assistance for developing countries, nor does it consider such programs
in developed countries as subsidies or non-tariff barriers.  As a result, the countries with
the highest unemployment, the greatest negative impacts on workers from trade reforms,
and the least capacity to develop competitive and job-creating industries are the ones
without trade adjustment assistance to aid displaced workers.
Another specific reform that has been suggested is the concept of Most Favored Pricing.
Similar to MFN, this policy would require TNCs to extend similar pricing to all WTO
members.  MFP targets the common practice by TNCs, especially drug companies, of
charging more in developing countries than in developed countries despite equal costs of
production, because in the latter they face greater competition as well as pressure from
the public and national health systems.  With TRIPS and the consolidation of large TNCs
in food production and pharmaceuticals, this practice has become more common.
Mandating MFP would simply require TNCs to grant the same benefits to consumers as
they themselves gain from the WTO’s free trade rules.
Finally, developing countries have requested special protection for domestic food
security.  Their position is that food produced for domestic consumption and small farms
should be exempt from liberalization to safeguard the fragile food security of these
countries and protect the livelihoods of the rural population.  This could be created as a
stand-alone item or by amending the Agreement on Agriculture.  The food security
safeguard is seen not only as a basic human rights issue for impoverished rural
communities, but also as a counterbalance to years of developed country protectionism in
agriculture that have placed developing countries at a competitive disadvantage,
Developing countries have begun to express strong opposition the lack of balance and
fairness in the WTO system, as illustrated by their positions at the recent Ministerial
meeting in Seattle.  They argue the developed countries have written the global rules of
trade without their input, and that the benefits have largely flowed to Northern countries
and companies.  The concept of free trade plus aid is intended to level the playing field
while still remaining within the basic free trade framework of the WTO.  While some
may argue that concepts such as technology transfer and funds for trade adjustment are
merely redistributive devices that unfairly burden developed countries, the entire basis of
neoliberal trade theory presupposes a level of fairness in international competition that is
lacking given the advantages that developed countries have gained from past
protectionism.
C. WTO Enforcement
C.1 WTO Enforcement Procedures
The WTO has very strong enforcement procedures through the Dispute Settlement
Understanding (DSU), which covers all WTO agreements.  These procedures include the
right to complain against violations, a speedy mediation and adjudication process, and
severe penalties to ensure compliance on the part of the losing party.  The dispute
settlement procedure of the WTO has the following stages: consultation, panel
investigation and report, appellate review, adoption of decision, and implementation.
When a complaint is brought against a WTO member, the parties first enter a
consultation and mediation process.  This process plays an important filtering role in
terms of pressuring parties to settle and avoid a panel.  If the dispute cannot be resolved,
a panel of three or five trade experts reviews the case in closed-door hearings open only
to the disputants.  All documents, briefs, and hearings are confidential.  The panel issues
a ruling, which can be appealed to the Appellate Body, consisting of seven appointed
judges. The findings of the panel or Appellate Body, as the case may be, must be adopted
without amendment unless rejected by consensus of WTO members.  Losing parties have
three choices: change the offending law to conform to trade rules, pay permanent
compensation to the winner, or face approved and non-negotiated countervailing trade
sanctions.  Most countries, including the US, have official policies of changing their laws
to conform to WTO decisions.
In its first five years of existence, 170 cases have been brought into the WTO dispute
settlement procedures, generally by the US or the EU.  Developing countries face a
marked disadvantage in participating in the WTO dispute system because they lack the
technical skills and resources to present complaints and also may be reluctant to
challenge powerful countries that control access to global finance and lending through the
IMF and World Bank.  Moreover, civil society groups are denied access to WTO
proceedings even if they were instrumental in establishing the challenged law or
regulation.  In fact, even states at the sub-federal level are denied participation in WTO
proceedings.  The absurdity of this can be seen in the fact that the state of Massachusetts
was not present at a WTO panel challenging its law not to give public contracts to
companies that do business with Burma, modeled on anti-apartheid laws.  Massachusetts
was represented by the US government, which opposed the law in the first place.
Needless to say, the law was ruled to violate GATT principles.  It should also be clear
that human rights and environmental laws, like the Clean Air Act, are not.  These citizen-
led democratic efforts to promote values other than trade and economic efficiency have
been consistently struck down by secret WTO panels whose procedures are closed to
everyone except disputing state party representatives.
Thus far every single environmental or labor regulation that has been challenged in the
WTO has been found to violate the rules of free trade, despite the fact that most of these
laws are clearly not forms of disguised protectionism since they were drafted and
promoted by citizens groups over the objections of industry and the government.  The
WTO's remarkable record shows the bias against human rights and other “non-trade”
norms inherent in the WTO system.
This bias has several sources.  First, as discussed above, trade law does not recognize
human rights principles but instead considers them to be non-tariff barriers to free trade.
This constitutes an impassable theoretical and practical obstacle, for if human rights
principles have no value in the free trade regime, then their implementation and
enforcement cannot be achieved through the trade framework.  Second, the few
exceptions that do exist in WTO jurisprudence are extremely narrow and tend to be
interpreted very strictly by trade bureaucrats sitting on adjudicative panels.  Third,
panelists have no expertise in non-trade issues such as human rights and have tended to
view them as either irrelevant or dangerous to free trade principles.  And fourth, the
proceedings of WTO panels are secret and anti-democratic, depriving civil society groups
and the public from any participation in decisions with enormous impacts on their
welfare.  These latter points are examined in more depth below.
C.2 Human Rights as a Barrier to Trade
The Havana Charter, the blueprint for the failed International Trade Organization,
allowed for members to take measures against “unfair labor conditions.”  GATT contains
no similar blanket provision.  Any restriction on trade based on human rights
considerations constitutes a prima facie violation of free trade principles embodied in
GATT Articles I (MFN) and III (national treatment).  The very first case decided by a
WTO panel made clear that health, environmental, or other non-trade values had no place
in the WTO system.
In early 1996 Venezuela brought a case against the US Clean Air Act after the
Venezuelan oil industry had failed in a similar challenge in US court.  Venezuela argued
that the emissions requirements in the Clean Air Act put Venezuelan domestic refineries
at an unfair disadvantage because their gas was not as clean as that produced in US
domestic refineries.  The WTO upheld this challenge, ruling that the Clean Air Act
violated the national treatment standard requiring similar treatment of like domestic and
foreign products.  The fact that the US law reflected a democratic consensus to prioritize
health and environmental concerns over cheaper gas was not relevant to the WTO panel.
Rather than face $150 million in trade sanctions, the US changed its law to allow dirtier
gas into the country.  This result appears to contradict the consumer choice element of
neoliberal economic theory.
Another case with negative human rights implications was the Caribbean Banana case.
Lobbied by TNCs like Chiquita, the US challenged the EU’s policy of granting trade
preferences to bananas grown by former colonies to enable local companies to compete
internationally.  The WTO ruled that the preferences violated MFN and authorized the
US to impose $200 million in countervailing duties.  The EU dropped its policy, resulting
in loss of livelihood and unemployment for thousands of Caribbean workers dependent
on preferential trade with the EU.
These and similar cases overturn key principles of multilateral environmental agreements
that protect the environment through trade discrimination, such as the Montreal Protocol
on Substance that Deplete the Ozone Layer (1987) and the Basel Convention on the
Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal (1989).
As discussed earlier, the Beef Hormone case eviscerated the Precautionary Principle, a
linchpin of numerous environmental laws including the Rio Declaration.  It therefore
appears that no trade-related attempts to protect human rights or the environment can
withstand challenge in WTO dispute mechanism.  This has grave consequences for global
governance given the enormous and increasing impact of trade on human rights and
environmental concerns.
C.3 Human Rights Exceptions to Free Trade?
The only barriers to trade permitted within the WTO framework are measures that fall
within the limited exceptions specifically provided for in Article XX.  These are
exceptions for public morals in Article XX (a), for human, animal, and plant life in XX
(b), for prison labor in XX (e), and for conservation of exhaustible resources in XX (g).
However, any attempt to rely on Article XX exceptions to free trade encounters three
significant obstacles.  First, WTO panels have in the past adopted a very narrow
interpretation of these exceptions.  Second, even if a trade-restrictive measure falls within
one of the exceptions, it must still pass a narrowly defined “necessity” test.  And third,
WTO panels have adopted a distinction between products themselves and the processes
used to produce the product (PPMs) in holding that trade restrictions based on PPMs
violate MFN and national treatment of like products.
The prison labor exception is narrowly tailored to address a specific practice, and cannot
therefore be used to cover broader labor rights violations.  It is conceivable that trade-
restrictive measures against states that violate labor rights could fall within the public
morals exception of Article XX (a).  This argument has been strengthened by the
adoption of the 1998 ILO Declaration of Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work,
which requires compliance with certain core labor standards as a condition of
membership for all 130 members.
10  Likewise, human rights violations could be
considered to offend public morals and trigger an exception to WTO rules given
universal recognition of human rights law by countries around the world.  Moreover,
exceptions based on human rights and labor rights should not run afoul of the WTO’s
prohibition on measures that constitute disguised protectionism and attacks on
comparative advantage.  It hardly makes sense that a country should be allowed to adopt
a national policy of compelling children to work in order to gain comparative advantage
and the protection of the WTO.
However, there is no WTO jurisprudence interpreting Article XX (a) to cover labor and
human rights violations.  At its 1996 Singapore Ministerial Conference, the WTO
rejected taking an active position on labor standards by referring such issues to the ILO.
Since the ILO has no jurisdiction WTO trade rules with labor impacts, that avenue seems
closed.  Moreover, on the strength of developing country concerns over disguised
protectionism, the Ministerial meeting at Seattle soundly rejected US attempts to
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introduce the issue of labor rights into the WTO agenda.  It is extremely unlikely that a
WTO dispute panel would disregard the express political will of the members and allow
labor and human rights measures through the back door of legal interpretation, especially
when past panels have demonstrated clear hostility to such concerns.
Even if a human rights measure somehow fit within an Article XX exception, it would
still have to pass the “necessity” test, a finding that the measure is not only necessary for
its human rights purpose but also the least trade-restrictive alternative possible.  This test
balances human rights and free trade, a utilitarian act hostile to the very purpose of
human rights.  Not only does test fail to recognize the high priority which rights must
hold in any policy determination, but in fact turns this on its head, and privileges trade
values.  In other words, WTO panelists with a built-in bias favoring trade values can
substitute a less effective human rights measure in place of a more effective,
democratically selected human rights measure, on the basis of the measure's effect on
trade.  Clearly this defeats the measure’s purpose of protecting human rights in the first
place, and also renders the Article XX exception meaningless.
The Tuna-Dolphin case in 1989, decided under the GATT dispute system, was the first to
introduce the products-PPMs distinction.  The US government was forced against its will
to sanction Mexico after a US court agreed with environmental groups that allowing the
sale of Mexican tuna violated the Marine Mammal Protection Act.  Mexico then
challenged the US policy as a violation of GATT.  In one of the most important decisions
on the environment, the GATT panel ruled that, although the US embargo fit within the
protection of animal life exception in article XX, it still violated GATT because Mexican
tuna could not be discriminated against on the basis of the manner in which it was caught,
or the process of production (PPM).  The panel’s decision essentially closed the door on
using Article XX to protect the environment or uphold labor standards, since by
definition violations occur during the production process.  Otherwise how can clothing
made by slave labor be distinguished from other clothing?
A similar case, the Sea Turtles Case, involved a challenge by India, Malaysia, Pakistan
and Thailand to US law that all shrimp sold in the US must be caught with inexpensive
turtle excluder devices.  A panel of three trade bureaucrats with no environmental
expertise ruled that the law violated GATT MFN and national treatment principles by
treating like products differently and discriminating against shrimp caught without turtle
excluder devices.
Nothing in the text or negotiating history of GATT justifies the products/PPM distinction.
In fact, several GATT panels upheld trade-restrictive measures relating to intellectual
property rights violations, which are a form of PPM since the end products look the same.
The bottom line is that WTO trade rules, as interpreted by the dispute panels, recognize
the protection of intellectual property as an important value that justifies restrictions on
free trade but not human rights or environmental protection.